We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private information to each bidder. The crucial feature is that one bidder is favored by the allocation rule in the sense that he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We fully characterize the equilibrium strategies for this auction format and show that there exists a unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Introduction
Motivation and results Auctions in which bidders compete for one unit of an indivisible good have been widely studied in recent years. Although the models differ along many dimensions, one common feature is that the object is awarded to the bidder who submits the highest bid. Contrary to that, our paper analyzes a two-player all-pay auction with incomplete information in which the highest bid does not necessarily win the auction. Instead, the allocation rule is asymmetric in the sense that one bidder is favored as he need not bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction.
The empirical significance of our setting comes from the well-known fact that all-pay auction are strategically equivalent to discriminatory contests. In discriminatory contests, each party exerts costly effort to compete with other parties for a prize, and the party who outbids all of their competitors wins the contest and receives the prize. In reality, the allocation rule in discriminatory contests is often asymmetric in the sense described above. For example, in German procurement auctions, although local authorities are obliged to choose the bidders with the lowest price, there is a clause according to which it can award the contract to a local bidder when this bidder's price is not more than 5 per cent higher than the lowest bidder's price. As a second example, consider the "in dubio pro reo"-rule in criminal law. According to this rule, a defendant will only be convicted if his lawyer presents considerably less quantity and quality of evidence than the prosecutor. Finally, assume that an enterprise hires a consulting firm, and suppose that firm A has a done some excellent in-house consulting before. Then, we often observe in reality that a potential entrant B is awarded the contract only if the quality of its proposal is considerably above the quality of A's proposal. Note that this can indeed be interpreted as an all-pay auction, because each firm (and not only the winner) has to exert effort to prepare a proposal.
To the best of our knowledge, these kind of asymmetric discriminatory contests have not yet been analyzed in a general framework.
1 In this paper, we fully characterize 1 See the literature review below.
1 the equilibrium strategies for this two-player all pay auction with handicaps when each bidder's valuation is private information. We show that there exists a unique pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Two further results are also worth emphasizing: first, the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply in our setting, since the bidder with the higher valuation will not win the auction with certainty. Second, although it is generally possible that the handicapped player bids more than the favored bidder if the valuations are identical, we show that it is not possible that the handicapped player wins the auction when his valuation is lower than the favored bidder's valuation. Hence, an inefficient allocation of the object can only result when the favored bidder wins the auction although he has the lower valuation.
Literature There is a large recent literature analyzing the all-pay auction: Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1996) provide a complete analysis of the all-pay auction under complete information. With asymmetric information, Krishna and Morgan (1997) extend the classic model by Milgrom and Weber (1982) where signals are generally affiliated to also include the first and the second price all-pay auctions. Lizzeri and Persico (2000) analyze under which conditions there exist unique pure strategy equilibria in general auction games, including the all-pay auction. 2 Amann and Leininger (1996) and Maskin and Riley (2000) consider auctions in which bidders are asymmetric in the sense that the valuations for each bidder are drawn from different distributions. This also implies that the bidder with the highest valuation does no longer win the object with certainty. While Maskin and Riley (2000) confine attention to winner-pay auctions, our paper is more related to Amann and Leininger (1996) as they analyze the all-pay auction. Moreover, we adopt and extend their approach for determining the equilibrium bidding strategies from a system of differential equations. As stated above, in all these papers and contrary to our model, the winner of the auction is the high bidder.
In contrast to the auction literature, there are a few papers considering contests with handicaps. Konrad (2002) assumes that handicaps arise from the fact that incumbents need to spend less resources in order to win the discriminatory contest. However, he restricts attention to complete information, so that only mixed strategy equilibria exist.
In the context of bribery games, Clark and Riis (2000) consider an all-pay auction where two players compete for a government contract awarded by a corrupt official. In such a setting, the authors show that the auctioneer can increase his expected revenue by introducing asymmetry in our sense. However, they confine attention to the case where valuations for the contract are uniformly distributed. Bernardo, Talley, and Welch (2000) analyze a litigation game where the litigants' evidence is unequally weighed by the court.
Since evidence production is costly, this leads in fact to a contest with handicaps. However, the game is a modelled as a Tullock contest, where each player wins the price with some probability depending on his effort (or bid). 3 This is different from our approach since the identity of the winner is stochastic even for given bids.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 the basic model is presented. Section 3 derives the equilibrium strategies and contains our main results. In section 4 we discuss an example, while section 5 concludes.
The Model
Basic Setup We consider a private value all-pay auction where 2 risk-neutral bidders indexed i = 1, 2 compete for a single object to be sold. Each bidder has valuation
where the density function 
where a coin is flipped in case that b 1 = t · b 2 holds so that each bidder wins with probability 1 2
. Thus, bidder 1 wins the auction only if he bids at least t-times as much as bidder 2, while bidder 2 wins if he bids at least 1 t -times as much as bidder 1. Without loss of generality we confine attention to the case t ≥ 1. Therefore, bidders 1 and 2 will be referred to as the "handicapped" and the "favored" bidder, respectively. 4 Clearly, for t = 1 this is simply the standard all-pay auction with private values. The value of t is commonly known.
Payoffs Following the setup of the model, for given bids b 1 and b 2 , payoffs are
and
Finally, expected payoffs are denoted by Π i and given by
Equilibrium Analysis
Since this is a static game with incomplete information, the equilibrium concept used is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE). A vector of bids (b *
Note that the asymmetry here refers to the allocation rule. This is different to "asymmetric auctions" in the sense of Amann and Leininger (1996) and Maskin and Riley (2000) , where the valuations v 1 and v 2 are drawn from different distributions.
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following set of conditions is satisfied:
In equilibrium, no bidder must be able to increase his expected payoff by choosing a bidding strategy other than b * i (v i ), given that the opponent adheres to his equilibrium strategy. The following definition proves useful for further reference:
The restricted domain D x(a) contains only those elements a in A whose image x(a) is positive. We can then state the following result concerning the properties of the equilibrium bidding strategies:
] is a monotone increasing bijection on a non-empty set D b i ⊆ [0, 1] and differentiable almost everywhere.
Proof. See Appendix 1.
Uniqueness of Equilibrium
We first show that in this framework an equilibrium is unique whenever it exists. The issue of existence is addressed below. Note that Lemma 1 also ensures existence of the inverse mapping
is the valuation bidder i must have in order to bid b. Equipped with this result we can now characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies in more detail. The maximization problem for bidder 1 when bidder 2 is playing some strategy b 2 (v 2 ) is given by
while for bidder 2, when bidder 1 is playing strategy b 1 (v 1 ) we have
The first order conditions to these maximization problems lead to the following system of ordinary first order differential equations which must be satisfied by solution candidates
For a given set of initial conditions, this system determines a unique trajectory of bidding strategies as it is Lipschitz continuous for v i > 0. That there is only a single pair of initial conditions (such that a solution to Eqns. (9) and (10) is indeed unique) follows from the following results concerning the properties of the equilibrium bid distributions
Lemma 2 (Equilibrium Bid Distributions) In any BNE, the bid distributions G 1 and G 2 have the following properties:
(ii) G i is continuous and strictly monotone increasing ∀i = 1, 2.
(iv) There is a single set of admissible initial conditions.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Part (i) of the Lemma characterizes one main difference of an all-pay auction with handicaps compared to the standard model where t = 1 holds. Clearly, it can never be optimal for bidder 2 (the favored bidder) to submit bids larger than 1 t -times the maximum bid of bidder 1 (the handicapped bidder) since he already wins with probability one when
Part ii) establishes that, in equilibrium, bid distributions must ensure that no bidder can increase his expected profit by submitting a lower bid while leaving the probability of winning the auction unchanged which is due to the all-pay rule.
Part iii) says that only one bidder's bid function can have an atom at zero. Intuitively, this follows from the fact that, given that one bidder's bid function has an atom at zero, the other bidder can always be better of by bidding some x > 0 whenever his valuation is positive. As one consequence, the coexistence of different sets of admissible initial conditions is ruled out as stated in part iv).
5 Similar statements for the case t = 1 have for example been derived by Amann and Leininger (1996) .
Existence of Equilibrium Rather than modifying equation system (9) and (10) directly, we extend the method adopted by Amann and Leininger (1996) who have analyzed the case t = 1 for valuations v 1 and v 2 drawn from different distributions. The advantage of this method is that it simplifies the problem of simultaneously solving a system of differential equations into a sequential procedure. This enables us to prove our main result:
Theorem 1 There exists a unique pure-strategy Bayesian Nash-Equilibrium in which bidder 1 (the handicapped bidder) chooses
and in which bidder 2 (the favored bidder) chooses
where the bijection k(v 1 ; t) :
Proof. Using a bijection k : D b 1 → D b 2 , the first order conditions (9) and (10) can be transformed into a set of differential equations expressed in a single variable v 1 .
Substituting k(v 1 ) for v 2 in Eqn. (10) yields
We can also make use of the identity of the two equations to yield
Now consider the bijection
with derivative
Thus, k(v) maps every type of bidder 1 onto that type of bidder 2 who bids 1/t-times as much as bidder 1. Note that due to our previous results and together with the appropriate boundary condition k(1) = 1, Eqn. (17) defines indeed a bijection between the domains of the different strategies which is differentiable almost everywhere. Using Eqn. (17) allows us to rewrite Eqn. (16) as
Hence, we end up with the single ordinary differential equation
The boundary condition k(1; t) ≡ 1 and the assumptions on F (v) guarantee a unique solution for k(v 1 ; t). Moreover, the equilibrium bidding strategy of bidder 1 must satisfy the differential equation 
as stated in the Theorem.
Inefficient Allocation when t > 1 Clearly, the allocation of the object in our auction does not only depend on the two bidders valuations but also on the allocation rule expressed by t. Hence, we can not exclude that the object is awarded to a bidder whose valuation is lower than his competitor's valuation. Furthermore, without further assumptions on the distribution function F (·) (see the example below), we can not say if the favored or the handicapped player bids more for identical valuations. However, we can show that the handicapped player will never win the auction if his valuation is lower.
This means that, even if he may bid more aggressively for particular distribution functions and for particular valuations, this can never outweigh his handicap. It follows that an inefficient allocation of the object can only result when bidder 2 (the favored bidder)
wins the auction although he has a lower valuation. This is expressed in the following Proposition, where W * ∈ {1, 2} denotes the identity of the winner in equilibrium:
Proposition 1 i) In any BNE, there can only exist the case where
while the case where v 2 > v 1 but W * = 1 does not occur with positive probability.
ii) The expected equilibrium welfare loss due to inefficient allocation of the object is given by
iii) This expected equilibrium welfare loss is the greater for large values of t, i.e.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
With respect to the welfare loss expressed in parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1, we have simply calculated the conditional expectation of the difference in the valuations of player 2 and 1, given that v 2 − v 1 < 0, and that player 2 nevertheless wins the auction.
Although this seems to be a natural definition of the welfare loss, one has to keep in mind that asymmetries are often introduced for welfare concerns not explicitly modelled here.
4 An Example
To better understand the impact of the asymmetry generated by t > 1 on the bidders' behavior, we consider the special case where the v i are uniformly distributed, i.e.
Using standard techniques, the solution has the form of some polynomial k(v 1 ; t) = αv 
and, by definition of k(v 1 ; t)
This leads to the bid functions G 1 = (( ) as a function of t.
The intuition for this non-monotonicity result is best explained by looking at marginal costs and benefits from increasing b i : Since marginal cost is always equal to 1 due to the all-pay rule, we can safely confine attention to the analysis of marginal benefit. Given (v 1 ; t) ). When t increases by ∆t, there are two effects: i) bidder 2 wins the auction not only in case that
. This effect (the "direct effect") unambiguously increases the marginal benefit for bidder 2 and thus his equilibrium bid. ii) as t changes, also b * 1 (v 1 ; t) changes by d dt b * 1 (v 1 ; ·) · ∆t and this also effects the probability of winning and thus the marginal benefit from increasing b 2 (the 7 For a formal description of the comparative statics analysis with respect to t, define t
Moreover, t max 1
2 , a concave function in t with an interior maximum at t max 1 (v 1 ) for e − 1 2 < v 1 < 1 and strictly increasing in t if v 1 = 1. Performing the same exercise for bidder 2 yields
which is strictly decreasing in v 2 . As t max 2 1 (v 1 ; t) < 0, so that competition gets weaker and marginal benefit from increasing b 2 decreases. When this effect is so strong that it overcompensates the direct effect, then b * 2 (v 2 ; t) also decreases.
9 An analogous argument holds for bidder 1, except that the direct effect always leads to lower marginal benefit as he does no longer win
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a two-player all-pay auction where one bidder is handicapped by the auction rule while the other is favored. The relevance of our analysis is due to the fact that all-pay auctions are strategically equivalent to discriminatory contests where these asymmetries are often observed in reality. We have shown that there exists a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. Furthermore, it is impossible that the handicapped player wins the auction when he has a lower valuation. Whether the equilibrium bidding strategy of each bidder is increasing or decreasing in t depends on t itself, on bidder i's valuation v i , and on F (·).
Coming back to the strategic equivalence of all-pay auctions and discriminatory contests, one can also interpret the bids as (socially useless) efforts undertaken to secure a rent. Then, it would be an interesting extension to compare the welfare loss from the allocation inefficiencies caused by the possibility of the favored party winning the contest even if it has the lower valuation to the welfare gain from the fact that total effort may be lower in such a contest with handicaps. However, one would then have also to take into account that handicaps are frequently introduced because the contest designer has a specific utility function. For instance, he explicitly wants to support local suppliers, or he may believe that penalizing an innocent defendant is worse than acquitting a defendant who is guilty.
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1
To prove the several characteristics of bidding strategies, we proceed in three steps.
First, we show that the structure of the payoff function induces non-decreasing strategies. Together with continuity, this in turn implies strict monotonicity and therefore differentiability and bijectivity on the restricted domain D b i .
As a first step consider monotonicity. For any v
Taking the sum of both conditions and reordering yields:
Using the explicit structure of the pay-off function, this leads to
But this only holds if b i (v 0 i ) ≥ b i (v i ) which proves monotonicity. We will prove continuity by contradiction. Assume that b 1 is not continuous at x ∈ (0, b 1 (1)). Stated differently b 1 (x) > lim ²→0 b 1 (x − ²) ≡ b 1 (x). This implies, that bidder 2 will not submit some bid b 2 ∈ (b 1 (x)/t, b 1 (x)/t) as he can always reduce costs while the probability to win the auction remains unchanged. Anticipating this, there is no reason for bidder 1 to increase bids from b 1 (x) to b 1 (x). Hence, we end up with a contradiction. Therefore bidder 2 will always bid slightly above b/t instead of slightly below, but that contradicts continuity. Analogously, a gap in bidding strategies of bidder 1 can be deduced from a plateau in bidder 2's equilibrium strategies. This proves strict monotonicity on the restricted domain. Therefore bidding strategies are differentiable almost everywhere and a bijection from the restricted domain D b i onto (0, b i (1)]. Finally, D b i has to be non-empty, as it can never be part of an equilibrium that both bidders or only one bidder send zero bids for the entire valuation space.
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